TY - JOUR
T1 - Education transmission and network formation
AU - Boucher, Vincent
AU - Del Bello, Carlo L.
AU - Panebianco, Fabrizio
AU - Verdier, Thierry
AU - Zenou, Yves
N1 - Funding Information:
We acknowledge the financial support of the European Research Council (ERC 324004 grant TECTACOM, ERC STRATEMOTIONS-GA 324219) and the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (grant ECO2017-87245-R). This
Funding Information:
research uses data from Add Health, a program directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris; designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and funded by the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (grant P01-HD3192), with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is given to Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain Add Health data files is available on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this research. Contact the corresponding author, Yves Zenou, at [email protected]. Information concerning access to the data used in this paper is available as supplemental material online.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022.
PY - 2023/1
Y1 - 2023/1
N2 - We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children’s homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids’ socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.
AB - We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children’s homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids’ socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85144692775&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/718981
DO - 10.1086/718981
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85144692775
SN - 0734-306X
VL - 41
SP - 129
EP - 173
JO - Journal of Labor Economics
JF - Journal of Labor Economics
IS - 1
ER -