Do managers act opportunistically towards the end of their career?

Rezaul Kabir, Hao Li, Yulia Veld-Merkoulova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

As managers approach retirement, their career horizons become shorter and they might start to behave opportunistically by taking a more risk-averse and short-term orientation. Long-term risky investments, such as research and development, can suffer the most from this problem as their payoff comes long after CEOs retire. To mitigate such behavior, most executive compensation contracts include long-term performance incentives. In this study, we hypothesize that long-term debt-like compensation in the form of defined benefit pension can make the career horizon problem more severe. We empirically examine the impact of managerial opportunism, influenced by pension compensation, on the research and development investments. We find that on average UK CEOs do not curtail research and development as their career horizons become shorter. But, the defined-benefit pension component of executive compensation leads CEOs, who are closer to retirement, to decrease R&D investments. Our results imply that executive compensation contracts need to be appropriately adjusted when managers approach retirement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)218-232
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Volume56
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2018

Keywords

  • Career horizon
  • Executive compensation
  • Pension
  • Risk-taking

Cite this

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title = "Do managers act opportunistically towards the end of their career?",
abstract = "As managers approach retirement, their career horizons become shorter and they might start to behave opportunistically by taking a more risk-averse and short-term orientation. Long-term risky investments, such as research and development, can suffer the most from this problem as their payoff comes long after CEOs retire. To mitigate such behavior, most executive compensation contracts include long-term performance incentives. In this study, we hypothesize that long-term debt-like compensation in the form of defined benefit pension can make the career horizon problem more severe. We empirically examine the impact of managerial opportunism, influenced by pension compensation, on the research and development investments. We find that on average UK CEOs do not curtail research and development as their career horizons become shorter. But, the defined-benefit pension component of executive compensation leads CEOs, who are closer to retirement, to decrease R&D investments. Our results imply that executive compensation contracts need to be appropriately adjusted when managers approach retirement.",
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Do managers act opportunistically towards the end of their career? / Kabir, Rezaul; Li, Hao; Veld-Merkoulova, Yulia.

In: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 56, 09.2018, p. 218-232.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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AU - Li, Hao

AU - Veld-Merkoulova, Yulia

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