TY - JOUR
T1 - Do generalist CEOs magnify boardroom backscratching?
AU - Evdokimov, Egor
AU - Hanlon, Dean
AU - Lim, Edwin Kia Yang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Boardroom backscratching, or cronyism, is an unethical practice where CEOs conspire with directors to receive remuneration beyond performance- and market-related factors. Premised on the theory of planned behavior, this study investigates whether CEO generalist experience magnifies the likelihood of boardroom backscratching. Using 9482 firm-year observations spanning 1999–2018, our analysis shows that firms with greater CEO generalist managerial experience are more likely to engage in boardroom backscratching, via both cash- and equity-based compensation. We provide further evidence that backscratching firms with CEOs that possess greater generalist experience tend to overinvest, particularly via non-capital expenditure, as a channel for empire building and private rent extraction. We also find that a higher portion of female independent directors sitting on the board and the compensation committee mitigates the positive relationship between CEO generalist managerial experience and boardroom backscratching, which we attribute to greater ethicality of, and increased monitoring exercised by, female independent directors.
AB - Boardroom backscratching, or cronyism, is an unethical practice where CEOs conspire with directors to receive remuneration beyond performance- and market-related factors. Premised on the theory of planned behavior, this study investigates whether CEO generalist experience magnifies the likelihood of boardroom backscratching. Using 9482 firm-year observations spanning 1999–2018, our analysis shows that firms with greater CEO generalist managerial experience are more likely to engage in boardroom backscratching, via both cash- and equity-based compensation. We provide further evidence that backscratching firms with CEOs that possess greater generalist experience tend to overinvest, particularly via non-capital expenditure, as a channel for empire building and private rent extraction. We also find that a higher portion of female independent directors sitting on the board and the compensation committee mitigates the positive relationship between CEO generalist managerial experience and boardroom backscratching, which we attribute to greater ethicality of, and increased monitoring exercised by, female independent directors.
KW - Boardroom backscratching
KW - CEO generalist experience
KW - Compensation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85111624778&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10551-021-04895-0
DO - 10.1007/s10551-021-04895-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85111624778
SN - 0167-4544
VL - 181
SP - 221
EP - 247
JO - Journal of Business Ethics
JF - Journal of Business Ethics
ER -