Do events have their parts essentially?

Paul R. Daniels, Dana Goswick

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We argue that mereological essentialism for events is independent of mereological essentialism for objects, and that the philosophical fallout of embracing mereological essentialism for events is minimal. We first outline what we should consider to be the parts of events, and then highlight why one would naturally be inclined to think that the object-question and the event-question are linked. Then, we argue that they are not. We also diagnose why this is the case and emphasize the upshot. In particular, we argue that the way we evaluate modal claims which concern events differs from the way we evaluate modal claims which concern objects. Ultimately, then, to our title question we say: the answer does not matter as much as you might think.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-320
Number of pages8
JournalActa Analytica
Volume32
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2017

Keywords

  • Events
  • Mereological essentialism
  • Mereology
  • Modality

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