TY - JOUR
T1 - Diverting domestic turmoil
AU - Amarasinghe, Ashani
N1 - Funding Information:
I thank Paul Raschky for detailed conversations that greatly assisted in shaping this paper. I also thank the Editor, Maria Petrova, three anonymous referees, Klaus Ackermann, Sascha Becker, Giovanni Caggiano, Gabriele Gratton, Roland Hodler, Sisira Jayasuriya, Miriam Kautz, Claudio Labanca, Federico Masera, Laura Panza, Amila Pathirana, Laura Puzzello, Eik Swee, Haishan Yuan, Yves Zenou, as well as seminar participants at Monash University, Applied Young Economist Webinar (AYEW), Oz Virtual Econ Research Seminar (OVERS), Royal Economic Society (RES) Annual Conference and the European Public Choice Society (EPCS) Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine. I gratefully acknowledge support of the Australian Government through its Research Training Program Scholarship.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2022/4
Y1 - 2022/4
N2 - When faced with intense domestic turmoil, governments may strategically engage in foreign interactions to divert the public's attention away from pressing domestic issues. I test this hypothesis for a globally representative sample of 190 countries, at the monthly level, over the years 1997–2014. Using high–frequency data on media–reported events, I find robust evidence that governments resort to diversionary strategies in times of domestic turmoil and that such diversion takes the form of verbally aggressive foreign interactions. Diversionary interactions are typically targeted at countries closely linked along cultural and geographic dimensions, and at countries with low levels of state capability. Interestingly, I do not find evidence of these strategies being effective in deterring domestic turmoil. Taken together, these findings provide new insights on governments’ systematic use of verbally aggressive foreign interactions as a short-term, low-cost, low-risk, strategic tool, to divert domestic turmoil.
AB - When faced with intense domestic turmoil, governments may strategically engage in foreign interactions to divert the public's attention away from pressing domestic issues. I test this hypothesis for a globally representative sample of 190 countries, at the monthly level, over the years 1997–2014. Using high–frequency data on media–reported events, I find robust evidence that governments resort to diversionary strategies in times of domestic turmoil and that such diversion takes the form of verbally aggressive foreign interactions. Diversionary interactions are typically targeted at countries closely linked along cultural and geographic dimensions, and at countries with low levels of state capability. Interestingly, I do not find evidence of these strategies being effective in deterring domestic turmoil. Taken together, these findings provide new insights on governments’ systematic use of verbally aggressive foreign interactions as a short-term, low-cost, low-risk, strategic tool, to divert domestic turmoil.
KW - Connectivity
KW - Diversionary foreign policy
KW - Domestic turmoil
KW - Football
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124544974&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104608
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104608
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85124544974
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 208
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
M1 - 104608
ER -