Disruptions in large-value payment systems: an experimental approach

Klaus Abbink, Ronald Bosman, Ronald Heijmans, Frans Van Winden

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This experimental study investigates the individual behavior of banks in a large-value payment system. More specifically, we look at (i) the reactions of banks to disruptions in the payment system, (ii) the way in which the history of disruptions affects the behavior of banks (path dependency), and (iii) the effect of more concentration in the payment system (heteroge-neous market versus a homogeneous market). The game used in this experiment is a stylized version of a model of Bech and Garratt (2006) in which each bank can choose between paying in the morning (efficient) or in the afternoon (inefficient). The results show that there is significant path dependency in terms of disruption history. Also, the chance of disruption influences the behavior of the participants. Once the system is moving towards the inefficient equilibrium, it does not easily move back to the efficient one. Furthermore, there is a clear leadership effect in the heterogeneous market.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)63-95
Number of pages33
JournalInternational Journal of Central Banking
Volume13
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2017

Cite this

Abbink, Klaus ; Bosman, Ronald ; Heijmans, Ronald ; Van Winden, Frans. / Disruptions in large-value payment systems : an experimental approach. In: International Journal of Central Banking. 2017 ; Vol. 13, No. 4. pp. 63-95.
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Abbink, K, Bosman, R, Heijmans, R & Van Winden, F 2017, 'Disruptions in large-value payment systems: an experimental approach' International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 63-95.

Disruptions in large-value payment systems : an experimental approach. / Abbink, Klaus; Bosman, Ronald; Heijmans, Ronald; Van Winden, Frans.

In: International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 13, No. 4, 01.12.2017, p. 63-95.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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