Abstract
The objective of this paper is to advance the theory relating to the determinants of target costing (TC) system adoption by firms. Although the existing literature identifies several factors, it mainly clarifies the circumstances under which TC adoption will add firm value, which refers to a benefit orientation. This paper uses Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategy typology to examine the cost orientation of TC adoption, which answers the question as to why firms do not adopt TC even when the existing literature alludes to the benefits of adoption. The paper argues that prospector managers possess the scope to take advantage of the high information asymmetry to avoid TC adoption, because their stock-based compensation increases with volatility in earnings and stock returns. In contrast, defender managers gain increased cash-based compensation with the adoption of TC, which helps achieve greater firm profits. The paper concludes with specific sources of agency problems and several avenues for future research.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 67-77 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Journal of Management Accounting Research |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2017 |
Keywords
- Cash-based compensation
- Defender strategy
- Information asymmetry
- Organizational cost
- Prospector strategy
- Stock-based compensation
- Target costing adoption