### Abstract

After some stage-setting in Section 1, Section 2 presents a proof oered

by Thomas Forster (in his book Reasoning About Theoretical Entities)

to show that procedure oered for eliminating denite descriptions from

a certain range of formulas always yields a description-free equivalent

for any given description-containing formula. (This equivalent amounts

to a formula in which the description in question has been given the

broadest possible scope.) In Section 3, we show that the inductive case of

disjunction in this proof (by induction on formula complexity) does not

go through as claimed, and that the result itself is not correct. In Section

4 we look at some similarities and contrasts between Forster's proposed

elimination procedure and one emerging more directly from one prominent

strand { the binary quantier approach { in the Russellian legacy. This

leads us, on a more positive note, to a few observations about a class

of truth-functions intimately connected with that range of contexts in

which the descriptive binary quantier is \scope-indierent" { the falsitypreservingfunctions { from which we pass, by way of conclusion, to a

corrective reformulation suggested by that discussion for the descriptionas-

terms treatment of Forster's discussion.

by Thomas Forster (in his book Reasoning About Theoretical Entities)

to show that procedure oered for eliminating denite descriptions from

a certain range of formulas always yields a description-free equivalent

for any given description-containing formula. (This equivalent amounts

to a formula in which the description in question has been given the

broadest possible scope.) In Section 3, we show that the inductive case of

disjunction in this proof (by induction on formula complexity) does not

go through as claimed, and that the result itself is not correct. In Section

4 we look at some similarities and contrasts between Forster's proposed

elimination procedure and one emerging more directly from one prominent

strand { the binary quantier approach { in the Russellian legacy. This

leads us, on a more positive note, to a few observations about a class

of truth-functions intimately connected with that range of contexts in

which the descriptive binary quantier is \scope-indierent" { the falsitypreservingfunctions { from which we pass, by way of conclusion, to a

corrective reformulation suggested by that discussion for the descriptionas-

terms treatment of Forster's discussion.

Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 28 |

Journal | South American Journal of Logic |

Volume | 4 |

Issue number | 1 |

Publication status | Published - 2018 |