Delusion and the Norms of Rationality

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (Book)Researchpeer-review

Abstract

According to the epistemic conception of delusions, delusional thought can be distinguished from nondelusional thought by the degree to which it involves departures from the norms of epistemic rationality. This conception is enshrouded in the DSM characterization of delusions and is presupposed by most theoretical accounts of delusions. This paper presents a number of objections to the epistemic conception and argues that the view is less plausible than an alternative approach that centers on the notion of proper function. According to the proper function view, delusions occur when the systems responsible for belief fixation fail to function in the way that they were designed to function. Thus understood, delusions can involve departures from the norms of epistemic rationality but they need not.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRationality
Subtitle of host publicationConstraints and Contexts
EditorsT.-W. Hung, T.J. Lane
Place of PublicationAmsterdam The Netherlands
PublisherElsevier
Pages77-94
Number of pages18
Edition1st
ISBN (Electronic)9780128046234
ISBN (Print)9780128046005
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • rationality
  • delusions
  • reasoning
  • deduction
  • abduction
  • belief formation
  • evidence
  • cognitive neuropsychiatry

Cite this

Bayne, T. (2017). Delusion and the Norms of Rationality. In T-W. Hung, & T. J. Lane (Eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts (1st ed., pp. 77-94). Amsterdam The Netherlands: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804600-5.00005-2
Bayne, T. / Delusion and the Norms of Rationality. Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. editor / T.-W. Hung ; T.J. Lane. 1st. ed. Amsterdam The Netherlands : Elsevier, 2017. pp. 77-94
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Bayne, T 2017, Delusion and the Norms of Rationality. in T-W Hung & TJ Lane (eds), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. 1st edn, Elsevier, Amsterdam The Netherlands, pp. 77-94. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804600-5.00005-2

Delusion and the Norms of Rationality. / Bayne, T.

Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. ed. / T.-W. Hung; T.J. Lane. 1st. ed. Amsterdam The Netherlands : Elsevier, 2017. p. 77-94.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (Book)Researchpeer-review

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Bayne T. Delusion and the Norms of Rationality. In Hung T-W, Lane TJ, editors, Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. 1st ed. Amsterdam The Netherlands: Elsevier. 2017. p. 77-94 https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804600-5.00005-2