Dehumanization: Its operations and its origins

Murrow and Murrow offer a novel account of dehumanization, by synthesizing data which suggest that where subject S has a dehumanized view of group G, S s neural mechanisms of empathy show a dampened response to the suffering of members of G, and S s judgments about the humanity of members of G are largely non-conscious. Here I examine Murrow and Murrow s suggestions about how identity-based hate speech bears responsibility for dehumanization in the first place. I identify a distinction between (i) accounts of the nature of the harm effected by identity prejudice, and (ii) accounts of how hate speech contributes to the harms of identity prejudice. I then explain why Murrow and Murrow s proposal is more aptly construed as an account of type (i), and explain why accounts of this type, even if they re plausible and evidentially well-supported, have limited implications in relation to justifications for anti-hate speech law.