De-confounding the neural constitution of phenomenal consciousness from attention, report and memory

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Abstract

In this chapter, we discuss possible confounds that need to be carefully controlled for when the neural constitution of phenomenal conscious perception is studied. First, we discuss previous psychological or neural studies that clearly dissociated confounding factors (in particular, attention, report and memory) from phenomenal consciousness. We discuss several important phenomena and experimental methods (e.g., aftereffects, change blindness and inattentional blindness, and brain-imaging results) whose implications for the theory of consciousness might be contaminated by the influence of attention, report and memory. Finally, we discuss necessity and sufficiency of report and memory for phenomenal consciousness
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness
Subtitle of host publicationTowards a science and theory
EditorsSteven M Miller
Place of PublicationNetherlands
PublisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Company
Pages81-103
Number of pages23
Edition1
ISBN (Electronic)9789027268785
ISBN (Print)9789027213594
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Publication series

NameAdvances in Consciousness Research (AiXR)
PublisherJohn Benhamins Publishing Company
Volume92
ISSN (Print)1381-589X

Cite this

van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Tsuchiya, N. (2015). De-confounding the neural constitution of phenomenal consciousness from attention, report and memory. In S. M. Miller (Ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Towards a science and theory (1 ed., pp. 81-103). (Advances in Consciousness Research (AiXR); Vol. 92). John Benjamins Publishing Company. https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.92.04box