Abstract
We consider the security of the n-party EKE-U and EKE-M protocols proposed by Byun and Lee at ACNS '05. We show that EKE-U is vulnerable to an impersonation attack, offline dictionary attack and undetectable online dictionary attack. Surprisingly, even the strengthened variant recently proposed by the same designers to counter an insider offline dictionary attack by Tang and Chen, is equally vulnerable. We also show that both the original and strengthened EKE-M variants do not provide key privacy, a criterion desired by truly contributory key exchange schemes and recently formalized by Abdalla et al. We discuss ways to protect EKE-U against our attacks and argue that the strengthened EKE-U scheme shows the most potential as a provably secure n-party PAKE.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 4th International Conference, ACNS 2006, Proceedings |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 226-238 |
Number of pages | 13 |
ISBN (Print) | 3540347038, 9783540347033 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2006 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2006 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 6 Jun 2006 → 9 Jun 2006 Conference number: 4th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/11767480 (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 3989 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security 2006 |
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Abbreviated title | ACNS 2006 |
Country/Territory | Singapore |
City | Singapore |
Period | 6/06/06 → 9/06/06 |
Internet address |
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Keywords
- Collusion
- Cryptanalysis
- Dictionary attack
- Key privacy
- N-party
- Password-authenticated key exchange