Cryptanalysis of a provably secure cross-realm client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement protocol of CANS '09

Wei Chuen Yau, Raphael C.W. Phan, Bok Min Goi, Swee Huay Heng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, we cryptanalyze the recent smart card based client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement (C2C-PAKA-SC) protocol for cross-realm settings proposed at CANS '09. While client-to-client password-authenticated key exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocols exist in literature, what is interesting about this one is that it is the only such protocol claimed to offer security against password compromise impersonation without depending on public-key cryptography, and is one of the few C2C-PAKE protocols with provable security that has not been cryptanalyzed. We present three impersonation attacks on this protocol; the first two are easier to mount than the designer-considered password compromise impersonation. Our results are the first known cryptanalysis results on C2C-PAKA-SC.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCryptology and Network Security - 10th International Conference, CANS 2011, Proceedings
Number of pages13
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Cryptology and Network Security 2011 - Sanya, China
Duration: 10 Dec 201112 Dec 2011
Conference number: 10th

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7092 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


ConferenceInternational Conference on Cryptology and Network Security 2011
Abbreviated titleCANS 2011
Internet address


  • attack
  • Client-to-client
  • cross realm
  • impersonation
  • password-authenticated key agreement

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