TY - JOUR
T1 - Corporate noncompliance
T2 - do corporate violations affect bank loan contracting?
AU - Duong, Huu Nhan
AU - Khalifa, Mariem
AU - Sheikhbahaei, Ali
AU - Sualihu, Mohammed Aminu
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Philip Mattera at Good Jobs First for sharing the data on corporate misconduct. We also thank Aneesh Raghunandan of the London School of Economics for his support with the data extraction. We thank Walid Saffar, Alfred Yawson, Emdad Islam, Jing Yu, and Lubna Rahman, and conference participants at the 6th Forum for Research in Economics and Finance, the 2022 FMA Global Conference in the Middle East, the 2022 FMA Global Conference in Atlanta, the 2022 World Finance & Banking Symposium in Miami, and the 2023 Sydney Banking and Financial Stability Conference for their insightful comments and suggestions on the earlier versions of this paper. Mohammed Aminu Sualihu and Mariem Khalifa are grateful to Zayed University for the Research Incentive Grant (RIF Number R22042).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2024
PY - 2024/9
Y1 - 2024/9
N2 - We examine the effect of corporate violations on bank loan contracting and document that borrowers with higher corporate violation penalties have higher loan costs. Higher corporate violations are also associated with more restrictive covenants and a higher likelihood of a collateral requirement. The increasing effect of corporate violations on loan costs is concentrated in opaque firms or those subject to more competitive markets or ineffective monitoring. Firms with higher violation penalties have lower future performance and a higher number of future violations. Overall, our results demonstrate that banks factor corporate violations into their lending decisions, thus shedding new light on the economic consequences of corporate violations through the creditors’ lens.
AB - We examine the effect of corporate violations on bank loan contracting and document that borrowers with higher corporate violation penalties have higher loan costs. Higher corporate violations are also associated with more restrictive covenants and a higher likelihood of a collateral requirement. The increasing effect of corporate violations on loan costs is concentrated in opaque firms or those subject to more competitive markets or ineffective monitoring. Firms with higher violation penalties have lower future performance and a higher number of future violations. Overall, our results demonstrate that banks factor corporate violations into their lending decisions, thus shedding new light on the economic consequences of corporate violations through the creditors’ lens.
KW - corporate violations
KW - bank loans
KW - financing costs
KW - noncompliance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85195408614&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107225
DO - 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107225
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85195408614
SN - 0378-4266
VL - 166
JO - Journal of Banking and Finance
JF - Journal of Banking and Finance
M1 - 107225
ER -