TY - JOUR
T1 - Coordination and contagion
T2 - individual connections and peer mechanisms in a randomized field experiment
AU - Babcock, Philip
AU - Bedard, Kelly
AU - Fischer, Stefanie
AU - Hartman, John
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Eric Bettinger, Olivier Deschenes, Peter Kuhn, Shelly Lundberg, Heather Royer, Bruce Sacerdote, Jon Sonstelie, Dick Startz, and Cathy Weinberger for helpful comments. We are grateful for funding by the Hellman Family Foundation, and excellent research assistance by Jennifer Carnan, Jennifer Schulte, Allison Nuovo, Christy Helvestine, Bonnie Queen, Jessica Evans, Natalie Brechtel, Randi Golde, Jennifer Milosch, Allison Bauer, and Ernesto Boffy-Rameriz. We are also grateful for assistance from Chris Clontz at the Recreation Center at the University of California, Santa Barbara. This experiment and research was conducted with IRB approval from the University of California, Santa Barbara. We are sad to report that Philip Babcock passed away after the original version of this paper was submitted to the Journal of Public Economics, but his inspiration and impact on the project will be easy to spot throughout the paper to those familiar with his work.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2020/5
Y1 - 2020/5
N2 - This paper investigates peer effects at the level of individual connections, leveraging the approach to shed light on peer mechanisms. In a field experiment using college freshmen, we elicited best friends and offered monetary incentives for gym visits to a treated subset. We find large spillovers from treated subjects to treated best friends but none from treated subjects to control best friends. We also find evidence of a mechanism: Subjects coordinate by visiting the gym with best friends, indicating that the intervention harnesses complementarities in utility or commitment mechanisms. Results highlight subtle peer effects and mechanisms that often go undetected.
AB - This paper investigates peer effects at the level of individual connections, leveraging the approach to shed light on peer mechanisms. In a field experiment using college freshmen, we elicited best friends and offered monetary incentives for gym visits to a treated subset. We find large spillovers from treated subjects to treated best friends but none from treated subjects to control best friends. We also find evidence of a mechanism: Subjects coordinate by visiting the gym with best friends, indicating that the intervention harnesses complementarities in utility or commitment mechanisms. Results highlight subtle peer effects and mechanisms that often go undetected.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85076587725
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104069
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104069
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85076587725
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 185
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
M1 - 104069
ER -