Cooperative concurrent games

Julian Gutierrez, Sarit Kraus, Michael Wooldridge

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


In rational verification, one is interested in understanding which temporal logic properties will hold in a concurrent game, under the assumption that players choose strategies that form an equilibrium Players are assumed to behave rationally in pursuit of individual goals, typically specified as temporal logic formulae To date, rational verification has only been studied in noncooperative settings In this paper, we extend the rational verification framework to cooper-ative games, in which players may form coalitions to collectively achieve their goals We base our study on the computational model given by concurrent game structures and focus on the core as our basic solution concept We show the core of a concurrent game can be logically characterised using ATL, and study the computational complexity of key decision problems associated with the core, which range from problems in PSPACE to problems in 3EXPT1ME We also discuss a number of variants of the main definition of the core, leading to the issue of credible coalition formations, and a possible implementation of the main reasoning framework.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
EditorsNoa Agmon, Matthew E. Taylor
Place of PublicationRichland SC USA
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781450363099
ISBN (Print)9781510892002
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2019 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 13 May 201917 May 2019
Conference number: 18th (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914


ConferenceInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2019
Abbreviated titleAAMAS 2019
Internet address


  • Concurrent games
  • Cooperative games
  • Formal verification
  • Logic

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