Contract design with information asymmetry in a supply chain under an emissions trading mechanism

Xin Ma, William Ho, Ping Ji, Srinivas Talluri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We aim to design an appropriate sourcing mechanism with information asymmetry in a supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple suppliers subject to an emissions trading scheme. The manufacturer purchases raw materials from suppliers, who hold private information regarding the green degree—that is, the unit emission rates—of their raw materials. An appropriate strategy must be adopted by the manufacturer for the contract design, including a series of payments and the order quantities; the suppliers are subsequently invited to bid for the contracts. The basic model is formulated to assist the manufacturer in designing a reasonable contract for a single supplier. The characteristics of the optimal order quantity and payoff functions of both the manufacturer and supplier are analyzed. A competitive procurement scenario with multiple suppliers is also discussed. With respect to the diversity of auctions, three different auction types are analyzed, including a green degree auction, a price auction with emissions targets, and a performance-based auction. In addition, an efficient emissions trading policy is established to guide manufacturers regarding how to balance their emission allowances based on the optimal order quantities. Our approach provides an effective decision support system for both the manufacturer and suppliers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)121-153
Number of pages33
JournalDecision Sciences
Volume49
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2018
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Asymmetric Information
  • Contract Design
  • Emissions Trading
  • Green Procurement

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