Constructivism, representation, and stability: path-dependence in public reason theories of justice

John Thrasher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Public reason theories are characterized by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral or political values outside of the procedure of agreement. Representation holds that the reasons for the choice in the model must be rationally explicable to real agents outside the model. Stability holds that the principles chosen in the procedure should be stable upon reflection, especially in the face of diversity in a pluralistic society. Choice procedures that involve at least two-stages with different information, as Rawls’s theory does, will be path-dependent and not meet the condition of representation since it will not be globally coherent. Attempts to solve this problem without eliminating the segmentation of choice in the procedure will run afoul of constructivism or stability. This problem is instructive because it highlights how public reason theories must evolve in the face of increased concerns about diversity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)429-450
Number of pages22
JournalSynthese
Volume196
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Keywords

  • Constructivism
  • Path-dependence
  • Public reason
  • Social contract
  • Stability

Cite this

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Constructivism, representation, and stability : path-dependence in public reason theories of justice. / Thrasher, John.

In: Synthese, Vol. 196, No. 1, 2019, p. 429-450.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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