Consciousness, concepts, and natural kinds

Tim Bayne, Nicholas Shea

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We have various everyday measures for identifying the
presence of consciousness, such as the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are many contexts in which these measures are difficult (if not impossible) to apply, and even when they can be applied one might have doubts as to their validity in determining the presence/absence of consciousness. Everyday measures for identifying consciousness are particularly problematic when it comes to ‘challenging cases’— human infants, people with brain damage, nonhuman
animals, and AI systems. There is a pressing need to identify measures of consciousness that can be applied to challenging cases. This paper explores one of the most promising strategies for identifying and validating such measures— the natural- kind strategy. Thepaper is in two broad parts.
Part I introduces the natural- kind strategy, and contrasts it with
other influential approaches in thefield.
Part II considers a number of objections to the approach, arguing that none succeeds.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)63-83
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Topics
Volume48
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

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