Conformism, social pressure, and the dynamics of integration

Gonzalo Olcina, Fabrizio Panebianco, Yves Zenou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a model in which each individual belonging to an ethnic minority group is embedded in a network of relationships and decides whether she wants to be integrated in the society. Each individual wants her behavior to agree with her personal ideal preference for integration but also wants her behavior to be as close as possible to the average integration behavior of her peers. We show that there is always convergence to a steady-state and characterize it. We also show that different preferences for integration may emerge in steady state depending on the structure of the network. Then, we consider an optimal tax/subsidy policy which aim is to reach a certain level of integration in the population.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)279-304
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume220
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2024

Keywords

  • Integration
  • Networks
  • Peer pressure
  • Policies

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