Coevolutionary learning in the tragedy of the commons

Julián Garcia, Fernando Nino

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperOtherpeer-review

Abstract

The joint utilisation of a commonly owned resource often causes the resource to be overused. This is known as the tragedy of the commons. This paper analyses the effects of coevolutionary learning in such kind of situations using genetic programming. In a game-theoretical approach, the situation considers not only the strategic interaction among players, but also the dynamics of a changing environment linked strongly to the players' actions and payoffs. The results of an analytical game are used to formulate a simulation game for the commons, then a series of computational experiments are conducted, obtaining coevolved game strategies that are examined in comparison with those predicted by the analytical model. The obtained results are similar to those predicted by classic game theory, but not always leading to a tragedy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages2202-2209
Number of pages8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2003
Externally publishedYes
Event2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003 - Canberra, ACT, Australia
Duration: 8 Dec 200312 Dec 2003

Conference

Conference2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003
CountryAustralia
CityCanberra, ACT
Period8/12/0312/12/03

Cite this

Garcia, J., & Nino, F. (2003). Coevolutionary learning in the tragedy of the commons. 2202-2209. Paper presented at 2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003, Canberra, ACT, Australia. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2003.1299945
Garcia, Julián ; Nino, Fernando. / Coevolutionary learning in the tragedy of the commons. Paper presented at 2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003, Canberra, ACT, Australia.8 p.
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Garcia, J & Nino, F 2003, 'Coevolutionary learning in the tragedy of the commons' Paper presented at 2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003, Canberra, ACT, Australia, 8/12/03 - 12/12/03, pp. 2202-2209. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2003.1299945

Coevolutionary learning in the tragedy of the commons. / Garcia, Julián; Nino, Fernando.

2003. 2202-2209 Paper presented at 2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003, Canberra, ACT, Australia.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperOtherpeer-review

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Garcia J, Nino F. Coevolutionary learning in the tragedy of the commons. 2003. Paper presented at 2003 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2003, Canberra, ACT, Australia. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2003.1299945