Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

Jonathan Newton, Simon Angus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not extend to more complex networks of interaction. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten, convergence to efficiency.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)172 - 187
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume157
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Cite this

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Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution. / Newton, Jonathan; Angus, Simon.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 157, 2015, p. 172 - 187.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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