CEO power and the structure of CEO pay

Chongwoo Choe, Gloria Y Tian, Xiangkang Yin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper fleshes out the rent extraction view of CEO compensation put forward by the managerial power theory (Bebchuk, Fried, Walker, 2002), and tests its main implications on the relation between CEO power and the structure of CEO pay. For a measure of CEO power most relevant to managerial power theory, we use the CEO pay slice due to Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Based on the sample of S P 500 firms for the period of 1999-2008, we find that the implied relation between power and pay is largely supported. Our findings suggest that the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay when the focus is on managerial bargaining power. Given the multiple dimensions of CEO power, however, the scope of power may need to be broadened for a better understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)237 - 248
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Review of Financial Analysis
Volume35
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Cite this

Choe, Chongwoo ; Tian, Gloria Y ; Yin, Xiangkang. / CEO power and the structure of CEO pay. In: International Review of Financial Analysis. 2014 ; Vol. 35. pp. 237 - 248.
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CEO power and the structure of CEO pay. / Choe, Chongwoo; Tian, Gloria Y; Yin, Xiangkang.

In: International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 35, 2014, p. 237 - 248.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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