Central bank communication and expectations stabilization

Stefano Eusepi, Bruce James Preston

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The value of communication is analyzed in a model in which agents expectations need not be consistent with central bank policy. Without communication, the Taylor principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability: divergent learning dynamics are possible. Three communication strategies are contemplated to ensure consistency between private forecasts and monetary policy strategy: communicating the precise details of policy; communicating only the variables on which policy decisions are conditioned; and communicating the inflation target. The former strategies restore the Taylor principle as a sufficient condition for anchoring expectations. The latter strategy, in general, fails to protect against expectations-driven fluctuations.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)235 - 271
Number of pages37
JournalAmerican Economic Journal. Macroeconomics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes

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