Breaking up is hard to do: The economic impact of provisional funding contingent upon evidence development

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Funding contingent upon evidence development (FED) has recently been the subject of some considerable debate in the literature but relatively little has been made of its economic impact. We argue that FED has the potential to shorten the lag between innovation and access but may also (i) crowd-out more valuable interventions in situations in which there is a fixed dedicated budget; or (ii) lead to a de facto increase in the funding threshold and increased expenditure growth in situations in which the programme budget is open-ended. Although FED would typically entail periodic review of provisional or interim listings, it may prove difficult to withdraw funding even at cost/QALY ratios well in excess of current listing thresholds. Further consideration of the design and implementation of FED processes is therefore required to ensure that its introduction yields net benefits over existing processes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)509 - 527
Number of pages19
JournalHealth Economics, Policy and Law
Volume6
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Cite this

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title = "Breaking up is hard to do: The economic impact of provisional funding contingent upon evidence development",
abstract = "Funding contingent upon evidence development (FED) has recently been the subject of some considerable debate in the literature but relatively little has been made of its economic impact. We argue that FED has the potential to shorten the lag between innovation and access but may also (i) crowd-out more valuable interventions in situations in which there is a fixed dedicated budget; or (ii) lead to a de facto increase in the funding threshold and increased expenditure growth in situations in which the programme budget is open-ended. Although FED would typically entail periodic review of provisional or interim listings, it may prove difficult to withdraw funding even at cost/QALY ratios well in excess of current listing thresholds. Further consideration of the design and implementation of FED processes is therefore required to ensure that its introduction yields net benefits over existing processes.",
author = "Duncan Mortimer and Jing Li and Jennifer Watts and Anthony Harris",
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Breaking up is hard to do: The economic impact of provisional funding contingent upon evidence development. / Mortimer, Duncan; Li, Jing; Watts, Jennifer; Harris, Anthony.

In: Health Economics, Policy and Law, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2011, p. 509 - 527.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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AU - Mortimer, Duncan

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AU - Watts, Jennifer

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AB - Funding contingent upon evidence development (FED) has recently been the subject of some considerable debate in the literature but relatively little has been made of its economic impact. We argue that FED has the potential to shorten the lag between innovation and access but may also (i) crowd-out more valuable interventions in situations in which there is a fixed dedicated budget; or (ii) lead to a de facto increase in the funding threshold and increased expenditure growth in situations in which the programme budget is open-ended. Although FED would typically entail periodic review of provisional or interim listings, it may prove difficult to withdraw funding even at cost/QALY ratios well in excess of current listing thresholds. Further consideration of the design and implementation of FED processes is therefore required to ensure that its introduction yields net benefits over existing processes.

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