Boardroom backscratching and audit fees

Dean Hanlon, Mehdi Khedmati, Edwin Kia Yang Lim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of backscratching between the CEO and directors on a firm's future performance, financial reporting quality, and audit fees. We find that the presence and extent of boardroom backscratching are associated with weaker future performance, poorer quality financial reporting, and higher audit fees. We attribute these findings to backscratching firms' increased business and information risks inducing auditors to exert greater effort and charge risk premiums in response to heightened audit engagement risks. We observe consistent results when extending our investigation to backscratching between the CEO and audit committee and between the CEO and the CFO, given that the audit committee and the CFO influence financial reporting quality. Finally, we provide evidence that backscratching firms display greater audit report lag and a higher likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion. Our study offers insights to regulators concerning policy development to strengthen board effectiveness and remuneration disclosures.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)179-206
Number of pages29
JournalAuditing
Volume38
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2019

Keywords

  • boardroom backscratching
  • board effectiveness
  • financial reporting quality
  • audit fee

Cite this

Hanlon, Dean ; Khedmati, Mehdi ; Lim, Edwin Kia Yang. / Boardroom backscratching and audit fees. In: Auditing. 2019 ; Vol. 38, No. 2. pp. 179-206.
@article{5048b9a24660413a9912e0336f2c1498,
title = "Boardroom backscratching and audit fees",
abstract = "This study investigates the impact of backscratching between the CEO and directors on a firm's future performance, financial reporting quality, and audit fees. We find that the presence and extent of boardroom backscratching are associated with weaker future performance, poorer quality financial reporting, and higher audit fees. We attribute these findings to backscratching firms' increased business and information risks inducing auditors to exert greater effort and charge risk premiums in response to heightened audit engagement risks. We observe consistent results when extending our investigation to backscratching between the CEO and audit committee and between the CEO and the CFO, given that the audit committee and the CFO influence financial reporting quality. Finally, we provide evidence that backscratching firms display greater audit report lag and a higher likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion. Our study offers insights to regulators concerning policy development to strengthen board effectiveness and remuneration disclosures.",
keywords = "boardroom backscratching, board effectiveness, financial reporting quality, audit fee",
author = "Dean Hanlon and Mehdi Khedmati and Lim, {Edwin Kia Yang}",
year = "2019",
month = "5",
doi = "10.2308/ajpt-52170",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "179--206",
journal = "Auditing",
issn = "0278-0380",
publisher = "American Accounting Association",
number = "2",

}

Boardroom backscratching and audit fees. / Hanlon, Dean; Khedmati, Mehdi; Lim, Edwin Kia Yang.

In: Auditing, Vol. 38, No. 2, 05.2019, p. 179-206.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Boardroom backscratching and audit fees

AU - Hanlon, Dean

AU - Khedmati, Mehdi

AU - Lim, Edwin Kia Yang

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

N2 - This study investigates the impact of backscratching between the CEO and directors on a firm's future performance, financial reporting quality, and audit fees. We find that the presence and extent of boardroom backscratching are associated with weaker future performance, poorer quality financial reporting, and higher audit fees. We attribute these findings to backscratching firms' increased business and information risks inducing auditors to exert greater effort and charge risk premiums in response to heightened audit engagement risks. We observe consistent results when extending our investigation to backscratching between the CEO and audit committee and between the CEO and the CFO, given that the audit committee and the CFO influence financial reporting quality. Finally, we provide evidence that backscratching firms display greater audit report lag and a higher likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion. Our study offers insights to regulators concerning policy development to strengthen board effectiveness and remuneration disclosures.

AB - This study investigates the impact of backscratching between the CEO and directors on a firm's future performance, financial reporting quality, and audit fees. We find that the presence and extent of boardroom backscratching are associated with weaker future performance, poorer quality financial reporting, and higher audit fees. We attribute these findings to backscratching firms' increased business and information risks inducing auditors to exert greater effort and charge risk premiums in response to heightened audit engagement risks. We observe consistent results when extending our investigation to backscratching between the CEO and audit committee and between the CEO and the CFO, given that the audit committee and the CFO influence financial reporting quality. Finally, we provide evidence that backscratching firms display greater audit report lag and a higher likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion. Our study offers insights to regulators concerning policy development to strengthen board effectiveness and remuneration disclosures.

KW - boardroom backscratching

KW - board effectiveness

KW - financial reporting quality

KW - audit fee

U2 - 10.2308/ajpt-52170

DO - 10.2308/ajpt-52170

M3 - Article

VL - 38

SP - 179

EP - 206

JO - Auditing

JF - Auditing

SN - 0278-0380

IS - 2

ER -