Belief elicitation under competing motivations: does it matter how you ask?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Beliefs, alongside preferences, are an important driver of behaviour. While preferences are often inferred by the choices made, measuring beliefs is not straightforward. We design a giving experiment to compare different methods of measuring beliefs, with and without monetary incentives. Consistent with a simple theoretical framework, we find that elicited beliefs about the giving decisions of others are biased and self-serving when no incentive is offered, with non-donors reporting that giving is rare. Offering a simple incentive does not reduce the bias in beliefs; however, this bias is not observed when using an incentivised method which makes the monetary outcome associated with accurately predicting beliefs more prominent. Our findings suggest that when self-interested motivations compete with accuracy incentives, beliefs are sensitive to how they are measured.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104830
Number of pages18
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume169
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2024

Keywords

  • Belief elicitation mechanisms
  • Donations
  • Experiment
  • Self-serving motive

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