Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections

Michelle Blom; Peter J. Stuckey; Vanessa J. Teague

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_2

Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections

Michelle Blom, Peter J. Stuckey, Vanessa J. Teague

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Risk-limiting post election audits guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect election results, independent of why the result was incorrect. Ballot-polling audits select ballots at random and interpret those ballots as evidence for and against the actual recorded result, continuing this process until either they support the recorded result, or they fall back to a full manual recount. Ballot-polling for first-past-the-post elections is well understood, and used in some US elections. We define a number of approaches to ballot-polling risk-limiting audits for Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections. We show that for almost all real elections we found, we can perform a risk-limiting audit by looking at only a small fraction of the total ballots (assuming no errors).

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Electronic Voting
Subtitle of host publication	Third International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2018 Bregenz, Austria, October 2–5, 2018 Proceedings
Editors	Robert Krimmer, Melanie Volkamer, Veronique Cortier, Rajeev Gore, Manik Hapsara, Uwe Serdult, David Duenas-Cid
Place of Publication	Cham Switzerland
Publisher	Springer
Pages	17-34
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Electronic)	9783030004194
ISBN (Print)	9783030004187
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_2
Publication status	Published - 2018
Externally published	Yes
Event	International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting 2018 - Bregenz, Austria Duration: 2 Oct 2018 → 5 Oct 2018 Conference number: 3rd https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4 (Proceedings)

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Volume	11143
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting 2018
Abbreviated title	E-Vote-ID 2018
Country/Territory	Austria
City	Bregenz
Period	2/10/18 → 5/10/18
Internet address	https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4 (Proceedings)

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10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_2

Cite this

Blom, M., Stuckey, P. J., & Teague, V. J. (2018). Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections. In R. Krimmer, M. Volkamer, V. Cortier, R. Gore, M. Hapsara, U. Serdult, & D. Duenas-Cid (Eds.), Electronic Voting : Third International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2018 Bregenz, Austria, October 2–5, 2018 Proceedings (pp. 17-34). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; Vol. 11143 ). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_2

Blom, Michelle ; Stuckey, Peter J. ; Teague, Vanessa J. / Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections. Electronic Voting : Third International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2018 Bregenz, Austria, October 2–5, 2018 Proceedings. editor / Robert Krimmer ; Melanie Volkamer ; Veronique Cortier ; Rajeev Gore ; Manik Hapsara ; Uwe Serdult ; David Duenas-Cid. Cham Switzerland : Springer, 2018. pp. 17-34 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ).

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abstract = "Risk-limiting post election audits guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect election results, independent of why the result was incorrect. Ballot-polling audits select ballots at random and interpret those ballots as evidence for and against the actual recorded result, continuing this process until either they support the recorded result, or they fall back to a full manual recount. Ballot-polling for first-past-the-post elections is well understood, and used in some US elections. We define a number of approaches to ballot-polling risk-limiting audits for Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections. We show that for almost all real elections we found, we can perform a risk-limiting audit by looking at only a small fraction of the total ballots (assuming no errors).",

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booktitle = "Electronic Voting",

note = "International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting 2018, E-Vote-ID 2018 ; Conference date: 02-10-2018 Through 05-10-2018",

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Blom, M, Stuckey, PJ & Teague, VJ 2018, Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections. in R Krimmer, M Volkamer, V Cortier, R Gore, M Hapsara, U Serdult & D Duenas-Cid (eds), Electronic Voting : Third International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2018 Bregenz, Austria, October 2–5, 2018 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science , vol. 11143 , Springer, Cham Switzerland, pp. 17-34, International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting 2018, Bregenz, Austria, 2/10/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_2

Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections. / Blom, Michelle; Stuckey, Peter J.; Teague, Vanessa J.
Electronic Voting : Third International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2018 Bregenz, Austria, October 2–5, 2018 Proceedings. ed. / Robert Krimmer; Melanie Volkamer; Veronique Cortier; Rajeev Gore; Manik Hapsara; Uwe Serdult; David Duenas-Cid. Cham Switzerland: Springer, 2018. p. 17-34 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; Vol. 11143 ).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

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AB - Risk-limiting post election audits guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect election results, independent of why the result was incorrect. Ballot-polling audits select ballots at random and interpret those ballots as evidence for and against the actual recorded result, continuing this process until either they support the recorded result, or they fall back to a full manual recount. Ballot-polling for first-past-the-post elections is well understood, and used in some US elections. We define a number of approaches to ballot-polling risk-limiting audits for Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections. We show that for almost all real elections we found, we can perform a risk-limiting audit by looking at only a small fraction of the total ballots (assuming no errors).

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Blom M, Stuckey PJ, Teague VJ. Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections. In Krimmer R, Volkamer M, Cortier V, Gore R, Hapsara M, Serdult U, Duenas-Cid D, editors, Electronic Voting : Third International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2018 Bregenz, Austria, October 2–5, 2018 Proceedings. Cham Switzerland: Springer. 2018. p. 17-34. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_2

Ballot-polling risk limiting audits for IRV elections

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