Attacking unlinkability: the importance of context

Matthias Franz, Bernd Meyer, Andreas Pashalidis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A system that protects the unlinkability of certain data items (e. g. identifiers of communication partners, messages, pseudonyms, transactions, votes) does not leak information that would enable an adversary to link these items. The adversary could, however, take advantage of hints from the context in which the system operates. In this paper, we introduce a new metric that enables one to quantify the (un)linkability of the data items and, based on this, we consider the effect of some simple contextual hints.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPrivacy Enhancing Technologies - 7th International Symposium, PET 2007, Revised Selected Papers
PublisherSpringer
Pages1-16
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783540755500
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET 2007 - Ottawa, Canada
Duration: 20 Jun 200722 Jun 2007
Conference number: 7th

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume4776
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInternational Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET 2007
Abbreviated titlePET 2007
CountryCanada
CityOttawa
Period20/06/0722/06/07

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