Arranged marriage, co-residence and female schooling

Indraneel Dasgupta, Pushkar Maitra, Diganta Mukherjee

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (Book)Researchpeer-review


In most parts of South Asia, patrilocal marriages and cultural norms indicate that the husband's family stands to retain a major part of any additional gain generated by an educated woman. This means that men are expected to have a strong incentive to prefer educated women as brides, especially given the significant returns to women's schooling. Parents of educated women should face lower dowry demands, and thus motivate them to educate daughters. However, the persistence of low levels of female education and available micro evidence on dowry payments both imply that such incentives are neither strong nor generalized. This chapter explores this apparent market failure by addressing the consequences of arranged marriage in India and discussing co-residence and female education.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDimensions of Economic Theory and Policy
Subtitle of host publicationEssays for Anjan Mukherji
EditorsKrishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Hiranya Mukhopadhyay, Uday Bhanu Sinha
Place of PublicationNew Delhi India
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages30
ISBN (Electronic)9780199081615
ISBN (Print)0198073976, 9780198073970
Publication statusPublished - 2011


  • Arranged marriage
  • Coresidence
  • Dowry
  • Female education
  • India
  • Parents
  • Women

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