Are Technologies Innocent?

Part Seven: Conclusion [Commentary]

Michael Arnold, Christopher Pearce

Research output: Contribution to journalReview ArticleOtherpeer-review

Abstract

Presents an analysis of whether technologies can be considered innocent from their intended purpose. In a series of installments it has been argued that moral agents are not in principle limited to members of the human race, that non-humans and in particular technologies can be considered to act in the world, and that when they do so, they cannot be regarded as just tools or dumb instruments, that the actions of technologies are willful and occur in the foreknowledge of consequences, in a significant way, and that even technologies that are distributed in time and space may be defined with sufficient specificity to allocate moral accountability. Taken together, it has been argued that technologies are not innocent, and can be held to moral account.

Original languageEnglish
Article number7947302
Pages (from-to)86-87
Number of pages2
JournalIEEE Technology and Society Magazine
Volume36
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2017
Externally publishedYes

Cite this

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Are Technologies Innocent? Part Seven: Conclusion [Commentary]. / Arnold, Michael; Pearce, Christopher.

In: IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 2, 7947302, 01.06.2017, p. 86-87.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview ArticleOtherpeer-review

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