Abstract
What sorts of sequent-calculus rules succeed in specifying a legitimate piece of vocabulary? Following on Arthur Prior’s discussion of the connective tonk, there have been a flurry of criteria offered. Here, I step back a bit, examining the role of structural rules in an inferentialist theory of meaning, and sketch a theory on which any way at all of giving left and right sequent rules for a piece of vocabulary is ok. Tonk, among other things, is a full citizen of coherent-idea-land.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 25-36 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Topoi |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Inferentialism
- Paradox
- Sequent calculus
- Structural rules
- Tonk
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