Anything Goes

David Ripley

doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9261-8

Anything Goes

David Ripley

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What sorts of sequent-calculus rules succeed in specifying a legitimate piece of vocabulary? Following on Arthur Prior’s discussion of the connective tonk, there have been a flurry of criteria offered. Here, I step back a bit, examining the role of structural rules in an inferentialist theory of meaning, and sketch a theory on which any way at all of giving left and right sequent rules for a piece of vocabulary is ok. Tonk, among other things, is a full citizen of coherent-idea-land.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	25-36
Number of pages	12
Journal	Topoi
Volume	34
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9261-8
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2015
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Inferentialism
Paradox
Sequent calculus
Structural rules
Tonk

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10.1007/s11245-014-9261-8

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Anything Goes

Abstract

Keywords

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