An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games

Andreas Leibbrandt, Raul Lopez-Perez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the motivations behind punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subjects design in ten simple games. We apply a classification analysis and find that a parsimonious model assuming that subjects are either inequity averse or selfish best explains the pattern of punishment from both third and second parties. Despite their unaffected position, we find that many third parties do not punish in an impartial or normative manner.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)753 - 766
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume84
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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