Abstract
In a period marked by extensive cross-national interactions, nationality may present an important focal point that individuals coordinate on. This study uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a coordination device. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play coordination games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that nationality serves as a coordination device if common nationality is the only piece of information available to the subjects. The strength of this device is nationality-dependent and diminishes when participants are provided with additional information about their partner. We also find that subjects are likely to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium at about the same rate if the partner has a different nationality than if nationality is unknown.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1392 - 1407 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Volume | 52 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |