An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets

Olga A. Rud, Jean Paul Rabanal, Manizha Sharifova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We test in a controlled laboratory environment whether traders in a bilateral exchange internalize the impact of their actions on market prices better than in a large market. In this model, traders choose asset holdings, constrained by a technology frontier. Next, each trader experiences a random shock which makes only one type of asset profitable. In a general equilibrium environment with incomplete markets, this leads to pecuniary externalities because traders increase scarce asset holdings beyond what is socially optimal. This behavior is especially exacerbated in large experimental markets as traders fail to internalize the impact of their actions on prices. We find that when markets are incomplete, a bilateral exchange can slightly mitigate the extent of pecuniary externalities, and weakly increase welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)253-267
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume114
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019

Keywords

  • Experimental market games
  • General equilibrium
  • Incomplete markets
  • Pecuniary externalities
  • Walrasian equilibrium

Cite this

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An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets. / Rud, Olga A.; Rabanal, Jean Paul; Sharifova, Manizha.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 114, 03.2019, p. 253-267.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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