An endogenous-timing conflict game

Youngseok Park, Jean Paul Rabanal, Olga A. Rud, Philip J. Grossman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020

Keywords

  • Conflict game
  • Endogenous timing
  • Gender
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Type uncertainty

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