Abstract
We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 592-607 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 186 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2021 |
Keywords
- Conflict game
- Endogenous timing
- Gender
- Laboratory experiment
- Type uncertainty