TY - JOUR
T1 - Algorithmic augmentation of democracy
T2 - considering whether technology can enhance the concepts of democracy and the rule of law through four hypotheticals
AU - Burgess, Paul
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag London Ltd. part of Springer Nature.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - The potential use, relevance, and application of AI and other technologies in the democratic process may be obvious to some. However, technological innovation and, even, its consideration may face an intuitive push-back in the form of algorithm aversion (Dietvorst et al. J Exp Psychol 144(1):114–126, 2015). In this paper, I confront this intuition and suggest that a more ‘extreme’ form of technological change in the democratic process does not necessarily result in a worse outcome in terms of the fundamental concepts of democracy and the Rule of Law. To provoke further consideration and illustrate that initial intuitions regarding democratic innovation may not always be accurate, I pose and explore four ways that AI and other forms of technology could be used to augment the representative democratic process. The augmentations range from voting online to the wholesale replacement of the legislature’s human representatives with algorithms. After first noting the intuition that less invasive forms of augmented democracy may be less objectionable than more extreme forms, I go on to critically assess whether the augmentation of existing systems satisfies or enhances ideas associated with democracy and the Rule of Law (provided by Dahl and Fuller). By imagining a (not too far-fetched) future in a (not too far-removed) democratic society, my conclusion is that, when it comes to democracy and the Rule of Law, intuitions regarding technology may lead us astray.
AB - The potential use, relevance, and application of AI and other technologies in the democratic process may be obvious to some. However, technological innovation and, even, its consideration may face an intuitive push-back in the form of algorithm aversion (Dietvorst et al. J Exp Psychol 144(1):114–126, 2015). In this paper, I confront this intuition and suggest that a more ‘extreme’ form of technological change in the democratic process does not necessarily result in a worse outcome in terms of the fundamental concepts of democracy and the Rule of Law. To provoke further consideration and illustrate that initial intuitions regarding democratic innovation may not always be accurate, I pose and explore four ways that AI and other forms of technology could be used to augment the representative democratic process. The augmentations range from voting online to the wholesale replacement of the legislature’s human representatives with algorithms. After first noting the intuition that less invasive forms of augmented democracy may be less objectionable than more extreme forms, I go on to critically assess whether the augmentation of existing systems satisfies or enhances ideas associated with democracy and the Rule of Law (provided by Dahl and Fuller). By imagining a (not too far-fetched) future in a (not too far-removed) democratic society, my conclusion is that, when it comes to democracy and the Rule of Law, intuitions regarding technology may lead us astray.
KW - Artificial Intelligence
KW - Democracy
KW - Rule of Law
KW - Algorithm
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85102518457&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00146-021-01170-8
DO - 10.1007/s00146-021-01170-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85102518457
SN - 0951-5666
VL - 37
SP - 97
EP - 112
JO - AI and Society
JF - AI and Society
ER -