A pragmatic approach to incompatible descriptions

If two descriptions are incompatible one might respond \they can't both be right" or \they must be describing different things". I argue that, in many interesting cases, incompatible descriptions do not lead to contradictions and the things they describe are perfectly capable of coexisting in the one world. They are different descriptions which have an equal claim to truth, even though they cannot be brought together under one overarching framework. Putnam suggested this pragmatic approach as a way of understanding the paradoxes of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, as he later conceded, his specific formulation contained inconsistencies. This paper focuses on two contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics - Consistent Histories and QBism - which carry on the pragmatic approach in important ways, without the inconsistencies. The shared elements are pragmatism, perspectivalism, a focus on rational reasoning for quantum mechanical systems, and the notion of information. However, neither Consistent Histories nor QBism achieves the equipoise between the subjective and the objective which Putnam sought in his work. I suggest a middle way, using the framework of a monadology to achieve equipoise.