A note on imperfect monitoring of agri-environmental policy

C. Choe, I. Fraser

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23 Citations (Scopus)


In this note the impact of imperfect compliance monitoring on the implementation of agri-environmental policy is analysed. A principal-agent model is used to demonstrate how imperfections in the monitoring process lead to higher social costs from policy implementation. Technical enhancements in the accuracy of compliance monitoring will therefore lead to a reduction in social costs. This is an important result with significant implications for the design and implementation of agri-environmental policy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)250-258
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Agricultural Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1998
Externally publishedYes

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