A Human Right to Relationships?

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Abstract

This chapter asks whether there is a human right to close personal relationships. It begins by providing a prima facie argument in favour of such a right: humans’ interests in close personal relationships are important, universal, and fundamental. It then explains that there are problems with the distribution, demandingness, and motivation of the correlative duties. The result is that each individual bears a human right only to ‘intimacy consideration’, not to close personal relationships themselves. The chapter then argues that things are different if we conceptualize the right as belonging to groups, rather than to individuals. It is argued that groups of co-intimates have rights that others respect, protect, and promote the group’s intimacy. The duties correlative to such group-held rights do not face the problems of distribution, demandingness, and motivation that plague the individually-held right. Group-held rights in this arena are an important moral and political tool.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBeing Social
Subtitle of host publicationThe Philosophy of Social Human Rights
EditorsKimberley Brownlee, David Jenkins, Adam Neal
Place of PublicationOxford UK
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter2
Pages31-51
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9780198871194
Publication statusPublished - 2022

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