A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation

Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa, Ngo Van Long

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We study the dynamics of equilibrium participation in an international environmental agreement aimed at increasing the stock of a global public good such as climate change mitigation. In contrast with previous studies, we assume partial cooperation among signatories and show that the coalition size can be large and increase over time, even when the initial coalition size is small. We highlight a novel trade-off between agreements that are narrow-but-deep-and-long-lived and those that are broad-but-shallow-and-short-lived. Our results show that loose cooperative agreements, which are broad-but-shallow-and-short-lived, are both welfare- and Pareto-superior to tight cooperative agreements, which are narrow-but-deep-and-long-lived. We also show that conditions exist under which the equilibrium coalition size is efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104036
Number of pages19
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2022


  • Climate change mitigation
  • Coefficient of cooperation
  • Differential games
  • Social welfare
  • Stable coalitions

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