A decade of dissent: Explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

Mark Harris, Paul Levine, Christopher Spencer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee. Contrary to findings in the FOMC literature (for example Havrilesky and Schweitzer in The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, pp. 197-210, 1990; Chappell et al. in Q. J. Econ. 108(1):185-218, 1993), the effects of membersa?? career backgrounds and the political channel of appointment on voting behavior are negligible, reflecting the distinct institutional constraints and incentives associated with UK monetary policy. Our findings also suggest that literature which characterizes voting behavior as being predominantly determined by membersa?? internal or external status is overly simplistic. This view is supported by econometric results appertaining to the introduction of memberspecific fixed-effects, which account for possible unobserved heterogeneity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)413 - 442
Number of pages30
JournalPublic Choice
Volume146
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Cite this

Harris, Mark ; Levine, Paul ; Spencer, Christopher. / A decade of dissent: Explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members. In: Public Choice. 2011 ; Vol. 146, No. 3-4. pp. 413 - 442.
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A decade of dissent: Explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members. / Harris, Mark; Levine, Paul; Spencer, Christopher.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 146, No. 3-4, 2011, p. 413 - 442.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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